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In a contest players compete for winning a prize by exerting effort and thereby increasing 
their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative 
position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with 
heterogeneous and homogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our 
results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of 
different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur’s identity is revealed sabotage 
decreases while retaliation motives prevail.  
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1  Introduction 
Contests or rank-order tournaments describe competitive situations, in which players receive 
fixed prizes according to their relative performance. More successful players obtain higher 
prizes than less successful ones. In practice, there are a lot of examples for such contests: 
relative compensation of managers (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Eriksson 1999), job 
promotion tournaments (Baker, Gibbs and Holmström 1994), contests between sales persons 
(Mantrala, Krafft and Weitz 2000), golf tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 
1990b), stock-car racing (Becker and Huselid 1992), horse racing (Lynch and Zax 1998) 
beside many others. Although contests are widely used as an incentive device, they suffer 
from a severe drawback. Since only the ordinal ranking of the agents’ output is decisive for 
obtaining the winner prize, each agent could in principle improve his position not only by 
increasing his own output but also by exerting destructive effort to decrease the output of 
competitors, e.g. by bullying in job promotion tournaments. Actually, sabotaging is often less 
onerous than exerting constructive effort which makes sabotage to become a serious problem. 
In our paper, we will focus on sabotage in contests with heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity 
is modeled via the agents’ cost functions, i.e. less able agents have a steeper cost function than 
more able ones. The combination of sabotage and heterogeneity is hardly considered in the 
literature, although it describes a highly realistic setting. For example, members of an 
organization typically have different abilities. While the subordinates themselves might be 
quite aware of the different characteristics of each other, e.g. because they have worked 
together for a certain time and may observe each other more accurately, their superiors often 
do not know the exact abilities. If the contestants can choose constructive effort as well as 
sabotage in this situation, different behavioral patterns may be possible. On the one hand, 
heterogeneity may destroy both constructive and destructive incentives (Lazear and Rosen 
1981, pp. 861-863; McLaughlin 1988, pp. 246-247): The less able agents resign and drop out 
of the competition, since they are the presumable losers. Here resignation is optimal to save 
on effort costs. Due to their superiority, the more able agents will also decrease their effort 
levels as a best response. On the other hand, heterogeneity may increase the intensity of 
sabotage against certain contestants (Chen 2003). If there is only a small number of more able 
agents (“Favorites”), these Favorites will become visible as the most serious candidates for 
winning the contest. If, in addition, there are only few winner prizes (e.g., only one promotion 
to a better paid job), sabotage among the Favorites will be very intensive. Furthermore, if less 
able agents (“Underdogs”) outnumber the competing Favorites, the Underdogs may 
(implicitly) form an alliance to concentrate sabotage on the Favorites. If, the other way round,   3
many Favorites compete against a few Underdogs, sabotage between the Favorites may 
escalate in a “battle of the giants”. The investigation of these hypothetical behavioral patterns 
is at its very heart an empirical question. 
In real-world contests, sabotaging can hardly be observed by a third party, because it is 
generally performed in secret.
1 Therefore, we have designed and conducted a controlled 
experiment in the laboratory to test the above hypotheses on resignation, superiority, 
visibility, alliance and battle of the giants. Moreover, we have distinguished two types of 
treatments. In half the treatments, the players do not learn the identity of the ones who have 
sabotaged them (no-information treatments). In the other half, the identity of the saboteurs is 
revealed (information treatments). This distinction has been made, since, in practice, victims 
of sabotage sometimes may be able to identify the culprits and sometimes not. For example, 
whether sabotaged members of an organization can identify the culprits may depend on the 
contenders’ closeness, their past experience, the knowledge of their colleagues’ characters and 
so on. To emphasize the importance of heterogeneity we also conduct symmetric treatments 
with homogeneous agents and contrast them with the asymmetric treatments. 
Our experimental design is based on a logit-form contest.
2 This type of model has been used 
for modeling rent-seeking behavior (e.g., Tullock 1980), patent and innovation races (e.g., 
Baye and Hoppe 2003), sporting contests (Szymanski 2004), and labor market contests 
(Kräkel 2002).
3 The findings of this paper show that heterogeneity and the form of 
heterogeneity (i.e., the proportion of Favorites and Underdogs in a contest) is crucial for 
sabotage behavior in contests. For example, under both information conditions Underdogs 
sabotage Favorites significantly less the higher the proportion of Favorites. This result 
supports the resignation hypothesis and cannot be expected from a theoretic perspective. The 
experimental results also show that both the productive and the destructive behavior clearly 
differ between the no-information and the information settings. Our data provides persuasive 
evidence that behavior is guided by the desire to retaliate if the identity of saboteurs is 
revealed. 
Only few papers theoretically address the problem of sabotage in contests. The first analysis 
has been done by Lazear (1989). His main result shows that the optimal spread between 
                                                 
1  In real organizations sabotage such as refusing to cooperate with others, deliberately transferring false 
information, or refraining from passing viable information is usually forbidden. Data on real-world sabotage 
activities can therefore hardly be collected.  
2  For logit-form contests see, among many others, for example Tullock (1980), Dixit (1987), p. 893, Gradstein 
and Konrad (1999).   4
winner and loser prize is lower in tournaments with sabotage than in tournaments in which 
sabotaging is excluded. The intuition for this result comes from the fact that both constructive 
and destructive Nash equilibrium effort increases in the prize spread. Konrad (2000) considers 
sabotage behavior in logit-form contests. His analysis shows that sabotage is particularly 
serious in contests with a small number of contestants. If there are many contestants sabotage 
may become less attractive because sabotaging one player provides positive externalities to all 
other players. Chen (2003) uses a rank-order tournament framework similar to Lazear to 
analyze productive and destructive activities in tournaments when participants vary in their 
abilities. The underlying assumption is that contestants might be differently talented to 
sabotage other contestants and to increase their performance by increasing their productive 
effort. An interesting result of his work is that a participant who is more talented in terms of 
the effectiveness of his productive effort than the competitors is sabotaged by other players 
more often. Kräkel (2004) considers sabotaging – as well as helping – as an instrument to 
undermine competition in asymmetric tournaments. Similar to our paper, in a two-stage 
model players first decide on sabotaging/ helping and then have to choose their constructive 
efforts at the second stage. In this context, players have an incentive to use sabotage for 
preempting their competitors. 
For obvious reasons empirical studies on sabotage in contests are quite rare. Garicano and 
Palacios-Huerta (2000) use field data from the Spanish national soccer league to test the 
implications of introducing the three-point rule in professional soccer. In the old system, the 
winner of a soccer match receives two points, but according to the new rule winning a match 
is rewarded by receiving three points. Hence, in terms of the contest theory the spread 
between winner and loser prize has been increased which, according to Lazear (1989), should 
result in higher productive and destructive efforts. The empirical findings confirm that the 
introduction of the three-point rule is indeed accompanied by significantly more constructive 
and destructive effort.
4 In another study, Drago and Garvey (1998) gather data based on 
questionnaires distributed among Australian companies and find that helping effort in 
workgroups is reduced when promotion incentives are large. Helping effort can be interpreted 
as the opposite behavior of sabotage and indicates the tendency of employees to cooperate 
with each other.  
                                                                                                                                                         
3  From Loury (1979) we also know that a logit-form contest success function is equivalent to a rank-order 
tournament by Lazear and Rosen (1981) that is characterized by exponentially distributed noise and linear costs.  
4  Note that Garicano and Palacios-Huerta approximate the intensity of destructive activities by analyzing the 
number of defenders whose aim is to reduce the output of the competing team and the number of red/yellow 
cards. Thus, part of the sabotage activities analyzed here are legal.   5
There are several experimental papers on tournaments and contests that are related to our 
study, but they do not deal with sabotage among asymmetric agents.
5 These experiments 
examine either the impact of heterogeneity on incentives or the impact of sabotage in a setting 
with homogeneous agents. Tournaments with heterogeneous agents have been analyzed in 
several studies (see e.g., Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 1987, Weigelt, Dukerich, and Schotter 
1989, Schotter and Weigelt 1992, and for a real-effort experiment see van Dijk, Sonnemans 
and van Winden 2001). The broad results of these investigations indicate that subjects that are 
disadvantaged ex ante either strain themselves all the more when competing against a more 
able player or drop out of the tournament, i.e. they exert a very low effort. Despite an eventual 
oversupply of the Underdog’s effort the sorting of agents is still feasible as the stronger agent 
does not slack off and emanates from the tournament as the winner more often.
6 This finding 
is in line with the experiment of Müller and Schotter (2003) who analyze the influence of 
prizes in contests with heterogeneous agents following the theoretic work by Moldovanu and 
Sela (2001). Müller and Schotter present clear evidence that efforts of laboratory subjects are 
bipartite: While the low ability workers either drop out or exert only little effort the high 
ability workers oversupply effort.  
The only experimental studies on sabotage in tournaments that we are aware of are Falk and 
Fehr (personal communication) and Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003a, b).
7 Their findings are 
based on tournaments with symmetric agents. They are consistent with those of Garicano and 
Palacios-Huerta (2000) as well as Drago and Garvey (1998) since both productive effort as 
well as the tendency to sabotage are significantly enhanced with an increased prize spread. 
We aim to fill a gap in the experimental contest literature by focusing on sabotage between 
heterogeneous players. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a two-stage contest model with 
sabotage which serves as the framework for our experiment. Section 3 summarizes the 
hypotheses we want to analyze. In section 4, our experimental design and procedure is 
described. The experimental results are presented in section 5. In section 6, we discuss three 
                                                 
5  In particular, for experiments on logit-form contests see for example Millner and Pratt (1991), Davis and 
Reilly (1998), Potters, de Vries, and van Winden (1998) and Weimann, Yang and Vogt (2002). 
6  Harbring and Ruchala (2003) investigate the influence of an increase in the winner prize on behavior of 
heterogeneous agents. They, however, find that the prize difference has to be sufficiently high to identify 
Favorites. 
7  In the work by Falk and Fehr sabotage is modeled as a binary choice between “sabotage” and “not sabotage” 
in a two-person tournament where sabotage always destroys the competitor’s total output. Harbring and 
Irlenbusch analyze sabotage activities in a setting with more than two agents. The modeling of their sabotage 
activity allows for different levels of sabotage similar to the modeling of effort levels to be chosen.   6




2  The Game 
We consider a two-stage game with three players or contestants. At the first stage (sabotage 
stage), each player i chooses his intensity of sabotage sij against player j (i, j = 1,2,3; i ≠ j). 
Sabotaging other players makes it more costly for them to exert effort. For simplicity, we 
concentrate on two sabotage levels sL and sH with sL < sH. After the first stage each player i 
observes  Si  , the total amount of sabotage ∑ ≠i j ji s  received from other players j  ≠  i 
(i = 1, 2, 3). All total amounts of sabotage are revealed to all players resulting in the cost 
levels of each player. These cost levels represent the different marginal costs of effort that are 
due to the sabotage activities at the first stage. At the second stage (contest stage) the players 
choose their efforts ei, while cost of effort depends on each player’s cost level. Figure 1 
summarizes the sequence of play: 
 









Figure 1:  Sequence of the game 
 
We adopt a contest success function of a logit-form contest which gives player i the winning 
probability  ) /( ∑ ≠ +
i j j i i e e e if e1 + e2 + e3 ≠ 0, and 1/3 otherwise. The contest winner receives 
the prize wH, whereas each of the two other players obtains the loser prize wL with wL < wH. 
Let  L H w w w − = ∆  denote the prize spread. Note that both activities – sabotaging and exerting 
effort – make it more difficult for the other players to win the contest. There is, however, an 
essential difference between the two activities: whereas sabotage hurts players individually, 
exerting effort simultaneously reduces the chance of both other players to receive the winner 
prize.  
All players i 
decide on 
sabotage levels sij 
against each other 
player j 
Cost levels of each 
player are revealed 
All players i 
choose their 
efforts ei 
A random draw 
determines the 
winner who 
receives wH, the 
others receive wL   7
To keep the model manageable in the following analysis we assume that players are risk 
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with ki > 0 and c > 0. In equation (1), the third term on the right-hand side describes player i’s 
costs of exerting constructive effort. The cost parameter ki determines whether a player has ex 
ante low costs, i.e. ki = kL, and can be called a Favorite, or high costs, i.e. ki = kH with kL < kH, 
and can be called an Underdog. As mentioned above Si denotes the total amount of sabotage 
∑ ≠i j ji s  which player i receives. The fourth term in equation (1) denotes player i’s costs of 
sabotaging other players. 
 
When looking for subgame perfect equilibria by backward induction we start by considering 
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Equation (3) shows that a player’s equilibrium effort 
*
i e  decreases in his cost parameter ki as 
well as in Si the total amount of sabotage received. Hence, given equal amounts of received 
sabotage a Favorite always exerts more effort and has a higher probability of winning than an 
                                                 
8  The second-order conditions are always satisfied.   8
Underdog. Moreover, the equilibrium effort depends on the marginal costs of effort of the 
other contestants.
9 Inserting (3) into the players’ objective functions EΠi according to 
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At the sabotage stage, the three players simultaneously choose  {} H L ij s , s s ∈  




3  Hypotheses 
The aim of this research is to gain deeper insights into the behavior of heterogeneous agents 
in contests when they may harm each other. According to our model agents may sabotage 
each other at the first stage, i.e. increase their competitors’ marginal costs of effort. Given 
these marginal costs of effort at the second stage, they compete for the prizes by exerting 
effort. As mentioned above there is a fundamental difference between the two activities: 
whereas players can individually hurt a specific other contestant by sabotaging, exerting effort 
simultaneously reduces the chance of both other players to receive the winner prize. 
Therefore, in a contest with heterogeneous agents a comparison of the individual sabotaging 
behavior from and against various types of players is particularly interesting. Thus, in our 
analysis we primarily focus on sabotaging behavior. In the following, we present our 
hypotheses.  
                                                 
9  Note that equilibrium effort is not monotonous in ∑ ≠i j j jS k , the sum of others’ marginal costs of effort. If 
∑ ≠i j j jS k  is smaller than 3 ki Si, i.e. three times the own marginal cost of effort, the equilibrium effort is 
increasing in ∑ ≠i j j jS k . If ∑ ≠i j j jS k  is higher than 3 ki Si the equilibrium effort decreases in ∑ ≠i j j jS k . 
10  Each player faces four alternatives at the sabotage stage: one can sabotage no other player, only one of the 
two other participants, or both other players. Consequently, in a given treatment, i.e. a given cost parameter 
combination (k1, k2, k3), a 4x4x4 matrix describes all possible outcomes for the three players with each cell 
containing the expected payoffs (eq. 4) given the optimal effort choices following from the respective 
combination of sabotage activities (eq. 3). For all treatments reported in this paper one can derive from the 
matrices that in the subgame perfect equilibria agents choose full sabotage activities. The matrices will be 
provided by the authors upon request.   9
HYPOTHESIS  “RESIGNATION”:  
Underdogs sabotage Favorites less the higher the proportion of Favorites. 
Underdogs might feel that their chances of winning the contest is low if they have to compete 
against many superior Favorites. Thus, they might resign and withdraw their sabotage activity 
because it seems useless. As mentioned above other experiments on tournaments and contests 
indicate that subjects that are disadvantaged either drop out of the contest or overexert effort 
(e.g., Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1989, Müller and Schotter 2003). In our context, we 
conjecture that the tendency to withdraw sabotage increases with an increasing superiority of 
the competitors. 
HYPOTHESIS  “SUPERIORITY”:  
Favorites sabotage Underdogs less the higher the proportion of Favorites. 
On the other hand, Favorites might consider the Underdogs’ chance of winning to be quite 
low if they are competing against many Favorites. Thus, they might withdraw their sabotage 
activities against Underdogs because they feel themselves to be increasingly superior to 
Underdogs the more Favorites there are. Both hypotheses “RESIGNATION as well as 
“SUPERIORITY” are in line with theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981, pp. 861-863; McLaughlin 
1988, pp. 246-247): The Underdogs, who are the presumable losers in the tournament, will 
choose low (constructive and destructive) efforts to save costs. In response the Favorites will 
also decrease their effort levels. Thus, tournaments will always lead to decreased incentives if 
it is common knowledge that agents have different abilities 
HYPOTHESIS  “VISIBILITY”:  
Favorites sabotage Favorites less the higher the proportion of Favorites. 
We expect that competition among Favorites becomes stronger the fewer Favorites are in the 
contest. If there is only a small proportion of Favorites, these Favorites will become visible as 
the most serious candidates for winning the contest. Hence, sabotage activities among 
Favorites should be quite high. If there are e.g. only two Favorites, each of them might think 
that he has a very good chance of winning if he harms the other competing Favorite. Things 
might appear to be different if many or even only Favorites compete against each other and 
none of the Favorites feels particularly predestined to win the contest. In this case sabotage 
might appear to be much less effective.    10
HYPOTHESIS  “ALLIANCE”:  
Underdogs sabotage Underdogs less than Favorites. 
With this hypothesis we conjecture that Underdogs tend to sabotage Favorites more than other 
Underdogs. Favorites might be considered as the more serious competitors on the way to win 
the contest. Thus, Underdogs might tend to (implicitly) form an alliance against the Favorites. 
This hypothesis is in line with the theoretic result of Chen (2003) who finds that abler agents 
are being sabotaged more often.
11  
HYPOTHESIS  “BATTLE OF THE GIANTS”:  
Favorites sabotage Favorites more than Underdogs. 
The last hypothesis regarding the sabotaging behavior of agents refers to our conjecture that 
Favorites tend to concentrate on other Favorites when exerting sabotage. Again, other 
Favorites might be seen as the more serious opponents to succeed in the contest. Thus, they 
have to be harmed at the first place. Once more this hypothesis is in line with the result from 
Chen (2003). 
HYPOTHESIS  “EFFORT”: 
(i)  Effort increases in the sum of the competitors’ marginal cost of effort.  
(ii)  Effort decreases with the agent’s own marginal cost of effort. 
At the first stage of the game participants exert their sabotage activities, which determine the 
marginal costs of effort of each competitor. After the marginal costs of effort have been made 
common knowledge agents have to decide on the exertion of productive effort at the second 
stage. Given our theoretical analysis in the previous section we expect that the exertion of 
effort at the second stage depends on the contestants’ marginal costs of effort. As we have 
seen above effort should decrease with the own marginal cost but increase in the competitors’ 
marginal costs.
12 
Based on these conjectures, in the next section we describe our experimental setup, which is 
designed to test our hypotheses. 
                                                 
11  The modeling of the contest in Chen (2003), however, differs from the context we use in this study. As 
illustrative examples for his finding Chen describes the situation that sometimes stars who seem to have good 
chances to win a contest in the beginning do not make it in the end. This might be due to heavy attacks, e.g. 
negative campaigning in presidential election contests aimed at a promising Favorite of the opposite party. 
12  Note, that as mentioned in footnote 9 equilibrium effort is not monotonously increasing in the others’ 
marginal costs of effort. However, in the range we adopt in the experiment this is almost always the case.   11
4  Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung 
at the University of Bonn. All sessions were computerized and the software was developed by 
using the toolbox RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995). In total 90 students of different 
disciplines were involved in the experiment. Every candidate was allowed to participate in 
one session only.  
We implemented three treatments with three person contests and varied the heterogeneity of 
agents. For an overview see Table 1. In one treatment we implemented a symmetric contests 
in which all agents had identical ex-ante marginal costs, i.e. we have ki = kH for each player i. 
We denote this treatment with Hom. In the two treatments with asymmetric contests there was 
one player i who had a different cost parameter ki ∈ {kL, kH} than the other two players. These 
treatments are denoted by Hetx with x = U if the majority of contestants are Underdogs and 
x = F if the majority are Favorites. The parameterization used in the experiment was as 
follows:
13  500 = L w ,  1000 = ∆w , sL=1, sH=1.4, kL=1, kH=1.4, c=1 and  {} 300 , , 2 , 1 , 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈ i e . 
Given these parameterization it is individually rational – in most cases even a dominant 
strategy – for each player i to choose the high sabotage level sH against each other player j. 
Note that choosing low sabotage levels would be Pareto-efficient. A theoretical comparison of 
the symmetric and asymmetric contests yields that the average equilibrium effort is higher in 
the symmetric contest in which players are homogeneous.  
 
Table 1: Experimental Design 
  Type of players  # Subjects  # Observations  # Rounds 
Hom  homogeneous (ki = 1)  30  10  30 
HetF  two Favorites (ki = 1) and one Underdog (ki = 1.4)  30  10  30 
HetU  one Favorite (ki = 1) and two Underdogs (ki = 1.4)  30  10  30 
 
We collected ten independent observations for each treatment. Each group of players 
consisted of three participants and the matching of the agents to groups was fixed for the 
whole experiment. To identify players over rounds a color (blue, red and yellow) was 
randomly assigned to each player. In the treatments with heterogeneity types were attributed 
to the players and they were informed by a note in their cubicles whether their type was a 
                                                 
13  We deducted an amount of 5 Talers for the exertion of each sabotage activity, i.e. 10 Talers for sabotaging 
both competitors. Thus, the costs for sabotage were linearly transformed by (12,5 ⋅ Σj≠i sij ) − 25. All payoffs and 
costs were given in “Talers” which is the fictitious laboratory currency during the experiment.   12
Favorite (low-cost type) or an Underdog (high-cost type). The cubicles were allocated by 
letting participants randomly draw cards. 
Before starting the experiment the instructions were read aloud to all participants. The 
language was kept neutral, i.e. we did not use the term “sabotage” that had to be chosen but “a 
cost level for the other player”. Moreover, the terms “contest” and “prize” were not 
mentioned. At the first stage (sabotage stage) subjects could decide to give the other player an 
“A” or a “B” that determined the other players’ cost levels at stage two (contest stage). 
Participants were informed that receiving “AA” from the other players meant lowest cost for a 
certain effort number, obtaining cost level “AB” the middle cost level and “BB” the most 
expensive cost level. Choosing a “B” therefore meant sabotaging the other player by 
increasing his marginal cost of effort. Participants received cost tables depicting the cost for 
each number that could be chosen at the second stage, i.e. in a treatment with heterogeneous 
players subjects received six cost tables, three for each type of player showing all the three 
cost levels.
14 After all participants had made their decision at the first stage they entered the 
second stage. 
Participants were informed about all players’ cost levels before the second stage, i.e. they 
received information on the other players’ decisions without knowing who decided for an “A” 
or a “B”. Participants then decided on their effort, i.e. an integer number between 0 and 300. 
Costs of efforts were presented on the computer-screen and additionally could be traced in the 
cost tables. When all numbers were entered a wheel of fortune was shown on the screen 
which was partitioned according to each player’s probability of winning the contest.
15 If the 
yellow player, for example, chose a number representing half of the sum of all numbers 
chosen in the group his yellow cake piece in the wheel of fortune covered 50 percent of the 
total wheel. The wheel of fortune then rotated and determined the winner who received 
wH=1500 Talers. All participants in a group saw the same wheel of fortune and thus could 
identify the winner. The other two players received wL=500 Talers. Payoffs of all players 
were displayed on the screen, and the next round began.  
During the whole experiment participants were not allowed to communicate with each other. 
A session consisted of 30 repetitions of the same tournament setting. The sessions lasted for 
about 1.5 to 2.0 hours. During the experiment the payoffs were given in Talers and in the end 
                                                 
14  A translation of the instructions and an example of a cost table are given in the Appendix. Original 
instructions were written in German. They are available upon request from the authors. 
15 For an example of the screenshot showing the wheel of fortune see the Appendix.   13
they were converted into Euro by a previously known exchange rate of 1 Euro per 1200 
Talers. All subjects were paid anonymously.  
 
 
5  Experimental results 
This section reports our experimental findings especially with regard to our hypotheses 
derived above. We start our analysis with a first overview on aggregated behavior at both 
stages of the game and compare actual behavior with our theoretic prediction. We then focus 
on the observed sabotaging behavior. Following this investigation of behavior at the first 
stage we discuss the respective effort exerted at the contest stage.  
 
5.1 Overview of results 
Table 2 provides the average sabotage and effort choices as well as the theoretical predictions 
for behavior at both stages. Given the parameter values chosen in the experiment, rational, 
risk-neutral and purely money maximizing agents should always sabotage their competitors. 
The experimental data, however, draws a different picture. Participants exert substantially less 
sabotage than predicted by the theoretical analysis. Note, that a situation where all subjects 
choose to sabotage each other occurs in only 12% of all contests at maximum.
16 
Table 2: Overview of aggregated results 
 Theoretic 
prediction 
Experimental results  Theoretic 
prediction 
Experimental results 
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If we compare the average effort exerted in the experiment and the theoretic prediction 
regarding equilibrium behavior with maximal sabotage at the first stage it becomes evident 
                                                 
16  In treatment HetU in 12% of all contests (30 rounds with 10 groups add up to a total of 300 contests in this 
treatment) all agents choose to sabotage every other person in the group. This figure amounts to 10.3% in HetF 
and 7.3% in Hom.    14
that the actual average effort is higher in all treatments (see also Table 2).
17 Note, however, 
that optimal behavior at the second stage is different if one considers the actually observed 
behavior at the first stage where subjects in general did not exert full sabotage. If one takes 
into account that participants choose these lower sabotage activities a different optimal 
average effort can be calculated which lies above the equilibrium effort as marginal cost of 
effort is lower.
18 Comparing the actual effort with this optimal effort conditioned on actual 
first stage choices, average efforts again are well above the theoretically predicted choices.
19 
Furthermore, the actual frequency of winning the contest is in line with the conjecture that 
Favorites win the contest more often (Wilcoxon test: HetF and HetU, significant at 10% level, 
one-tailed).  
Regarding the differences in behavior between the treatments we find two clear results. First 
of all, the average sabotage activities exerted are significantly higher in HetU than in Hom 
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed). According to our theoretic 
prediction the average effort levels should be higher in the Hom treatment than in the HetF 
treatment with one Underdog, and effort in HetF should be higher than in HetU with two 
Underdogs. The only significant difference in effort behavior between treatments is that 
average effort is weakly significantly higher in Hom than in HetU (Mann-Whitney U test, 
significant at 10% level, one-tailed). 
 
 
5.1  Sabotaging Behavior 
Let us now analyze the sabotage activity more deeply. Figure 2 shows the development of 
sabotage frequencies over rounds for all three treatments. In all treatments sabotage activities 
appear to be increasing over the first ten rounds. In the following rounds 20 to 30 the 
frequencies are rather stable. The relation of sabotage frequencies between treatments 
mentioned above persists over all rounds: on average sabotage in HetU is higher than in HetF 
                                                 
17  If one compares the average effort of each independent observation with the theoretic prediction, effort lies 
significantly more often above the predicted level than below. This can be confirmed by the Binomial test with 
an event probability of 0.5 for Hom at a level of significance of 0.1%, for HetF (Favorites at 10%, the Underdog 
at 5%) and partly for HetU (Underdogs at 10%), all one-tailed.  
18  The average optimal effort based on actual sabotage activities was calculated by weighting each average 
optimal effort regarding a certain constellation of marginal costs of effort, i.e. a certain constellation of sabotage 
activities and heterogeneity of players, with the frequency of this situation. 
19  Applying the Binomial test average effort per independent observation lies significantly more often above the 
theoretic prediction than below in Hom and HetU at a significance level of 5% (one-tailed). In HetF effort per 
group is not significantly more often above the theoretic prediction although the average effort over all 
observations is considerably higher.   15
and is lowest in Hom. We still have to disentangle sabotaging behavior summarized in 
Table 2 regarding the actions of Underdogs and Favorites. Figure 3 shows the percentages of 
sabotage exerted by each type of agent towards each type of agent for all three treatments. 
Along this classification of exerted sabotage we are able to approach our hypotheses stated in 
section 3. Our first three hypotheses are based on a comparison of the sabotage behavior 
between the treatments. We compare the sabotage of Underdogs (Favorites) towards Favorites 
(Underdogs) between both asymmetric contests and the sabotage activities among Favorites 
between HetF and Hom. 
 







































We conjecture that Underdogs sabotage Favorites less the higher the proportion of strong 
agents, i.e. Underdogs should sabotage Favorites less in HetF with two Favorites than in HetU 
with only one Favorite. Figure 3 already indicates that we find confirming evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis “RESIGNATION”. 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “RESIGNATION”:  
Underdogs sabotage Favorites less in HetF than in HetU. 
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed) 
Thus, Underdogs seem to assume that their chance of winning decreases with an increasing 
proportion of Favorites and therefore exert less sabotage activity.  
On the other hand, we conjecture that the Favorites sabotage Underdogs less the higher the 
proportion of Underdogs as they might feel superior such that high sabotage activities are not 
necessary. However, we cannot confirm the hypothesis “SUPERIORITY” as the sabotage 
activity of the Favorites aimed at Underdogs is not significantly larger in HetU than in HetF.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “SUPERIORITY”:  
Favorites do not sabotage Underdogs less in HetF than in HetU. 
Our next hypothesis is based on a comparison between the Favorites’ sabotage activities 
among themselves in the asymmetric treatment HetF with two Favorites and the symmetric 
contest with three Favorites. We can confirm our hypothesis “VISIBILITY”. 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “VISIBILITY”:  
Favorites sabotage Favorites less in Hom than in HetF.  
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed) 
Interestingly, Favorites compete more fiercely against other Favorites with respect to sabotage 
activities if they face a lower number of these serious competitors.  
In the following the observations on two further hypotheses are presented by focusing on the 
behavior of a specific type of agent within one treatment. We analyze the sabotage activities 
of Underdogs in HetU first. Underdogs in HetU may either sabotage the other Underdog or 
the Favorite. As stated above we conjecture that Underdogs tend to sabotage the Favorite, i.e. 
the “star” of the game rather than the other Underdog.    17
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “ALLIANCE”:  
Underdogs do not sabotage Underdogs less than Favorites in HetU.  
Although average activities seem to confirm our hypothesis the difference is not significant at 
a conventional level. However, we find that in total Favorites are targeted by sabotage than 
the Underdogs in HetU (Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 1% level, one-tailed, see also 
Table 2).
20 
Our last hypothesis on sabotage refers to the behavior of Favorites in HetF who may decide 
on sabotage towards the other Favorite and the Underdog. We conjecture that Favorites tend 
to sabotage other Favorites more often than the Underdog.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “BATTLE OF THE GIANTS”:  
Favorites sabotage each other more than the Underdog in HetF.  
(Mann-Whitney U test, weakly significant at 10% level, one-tailed)  
This seems to be in line with our observation on the hypothesis “VISIBILITY” from above. 
Favorites seem to concentrate on their “giants’ battle”. 
 
 
5.2  Effort at the Contest Stage 
The average effort exerted over rounds in the three treatments is shown in Figure 4. In each 
treatment average effort keeps relatively constant over rounds. While average effort in Hom is 
almost always higher than in the heterogeneous treatments, the highest of the latter two 
alternates over rounds. 
 
                                                 
20  This is also due to the fact that Underdogs sabotage the Favorite slightly more often than the Favorite the 
Underdogs (Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 10% level, one-tailed).   18
Figure 4:  Average effort over rounds (data points represent averages over 3 rounds) 
 
According to the hypothesis “EFFORT” the exertion of effort at the second stage depends on 
the marginal costs of effort of contestants which is qualitatively in line with our theoretic 
prediction. In section 3, we mentioned already that the exertion of effort depends on the own 
marginal cost of effort as well as the sum of marginal costs of the competitors. Note, that a 
competitor’s marginal cost is a compound of the heterogeneity parameter as well as the 
amount of sabotage received by others. Table 3 denotes those marginal costs of effort which a 
participant might be facing. Every player can sabotage both other players in the three-person 
contest, i.e. there exist three feasible levels of being sabotaged: C0 denotes the cost level when 
no other player exerts sabotage on that player, C1 is the cost level when one is sabotaged by 
one other player, and C2 means that one is sabotaged by both other players. 
Table 3: Feasible marginal costs of effort kiSi 
cost type  low cost type (Favorite)  high cost type (Underdog) 
sabotage received  C0 C 1 C 2 C 0 C 1 C 2 
Hom  2 2.4  2.8 -  -  - 
HetF, HetU  2  2.4 2.8 2.8  3.36  3.92 
 
Figure 5 depicts the effort levels predicted by theory as well as the actually observed average 












[3xth round]  19
other contestants’ marginal costs. Visual inspection suggests that average observed effort 
choices are qualitatively in line with theory. 
 
Figure 5: Theoretically predicted and actually observed
21 effort levels dependent on the 
constellation of marginal costs of effort (omc = own marginal cost of effort) 
 
The statistical analysis yields that effort is significantly increasing with the sum of the 
competitors’ marginal cost of effort.
22 Moreover, the effort level chosen is also in line with 
the theoretic prediction regarding the influence of the own marginal cost of effort.
23  
                                                 
21  Average efforts that occur in less than three groups or less than ten times are not depicted in the figure. 
22  We analyze the trend of average effort choices over the sum of marginal costs of competitors while keeping 
the own marginal cost of effort constant, i.e., the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between these average 
efforts and the sum of marginal costs of the competitors is computed for each own marginal cost given. By 
applying the Binomial test with an event probability of 0.5 we find that the correlation coefficients are 
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OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “EFFORT”:  
Effort increases with the sum of the competitors’ marginal cost of effort.  
Effort decreases with the agent’s own marginal cost of effort. 
The data reveals one interesting behavioral pattern regarding the exertion of effort that can be 
observed in some groups and is not expected from the theoretic prediction. Obviously, some 
players tend to increase their effort with the amount of sabotage they receive. This is in line 
with the behavior of several Underdogs who choose an effort level that causes them costs 
which even exceed the prize difference of 1000 Taler when being maximally sabotaged in the 
stage before. Thus, in total these players would be been better off by not exerting any effort at 
all. This phenomenon of such “more than ever”-types of players, however, is not a 
representative behavioral pattern.
24 
We designed our experiment such that both the cost parameter that introduces heterogeneity 
among agents and the sabotage parameter are chosen from the same set, i.e.  { } 4 1 1 . , ki ∈  and 
{ } 4 . 1 , 1 ∈ ij s  . Therefore, identical marginal costs ki Si may result from different constellations 
of the cost parameters ki and the amount of received sabotage Si (see Table 3). Let us consider 
the constellations k1S1 – k2S2 – k3S3, i.e. all combinations of marginal costs for the three 
players. One can show that there are 10 different constellations in the symmetric contest. In 
the asymmetric contests there are 18 different constellations. Note, that several constellations 
might occur in the symmetric contests as well as in the asymmetric ones, e.g. 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.8, 
2.0 – 2.8 – 2.8, 2.0 – 2.0 – 2.8, 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.8, 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.8. 
As effort only depends on the constellation of marginal costs of effort, i.e. the own marginal 
cost of effort and the competitors’ marginal costs according to theory, subjects should behave 
identically if the constellation of marginal costs of effort is identical. Thus, their behavior 
should not be influenced by the way the marginal costs are generated, by sabotage or by ex 
ante heterogeneity. Figure 6 depicts the average effort in two treatments regarding a specific 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 The difference between the average effort for two adjacent own marginal costs of effort is computed while 
keeping the sum of the marginal costs of competitors constant. We count how often this difference is positive. 
By applying  the Binomial test we find that more than half of the differences are significantly more often positive 
than negative at a level of significance of at least 5% (one-tailed). 
24 If participants decide to retaliate for being sabotaged they can actually opt for two alternatives: first, by 
sabotaging other players in the following round, or second, by exerting high efforts and hereby reducing the 
probability of winning for the other players. If one takes a look at the distribution of effort costs one observes 
that there are always agents being sabotaged twice who exert maximal effort and thus, have to bear maximal cost 
of effort. This behavioral pattern is quite consistent in all treatments and supports the conjecture that participants 
retaliate for a high cost level by exerting maximal effort and decreasing other agents’ winning probability.   21
cost constellation: 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.8.
25 Efforts are averaged over the two players who face a 
marginal cost of 2.4. The sabotage received as well as the type of player is depicted. Taking a 
look at the amount of average efforts already reveals an interesting finding. Obviously, the 
emergence of the marginal cost of effort (ex ante heterogeneity or sabotage) affects the 
behavior of players. 
 
Figure 6: Average effort in different treatments with the same constellation of marginal 
costs (mc) 
 
In the homogenous treatment average efforts are qualitatively in line with our theoretic 
prediction. The subject, who faces the higher marginal cost exerts a significantly lower effort 
than the one with a lower marginal cost (Wilcoxon test: Hom C1 vs. Hom C2 α = .05, one-
tailed). In the asymmetric treatment, however, a different behavioral pattern emerges (see 
Figure 6). Surprisingly, in HetF the participants facing the higher marginal cost of 2.8 exert 
an even higher (weakly significant) average effort than the subjects with lower marginal cost 
(Wilcoxon test: HetF [marginal cost = 2.4: Favorite and C1] vs. HetF [marginal cost = 2.8: 
Underdog and C0] α = .1, two-tailed). If one compares the average efforts of those subjects 
with the same marginal costs between treatments one can see that the average efforts of those 
                                                 
25  There are still other constellations, which are identical in different treatments, but not all constellations occur 
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players with lower marginal cost are significantly higher in the homogenous treatment than in 
the heterogeneous one (Mann-Whitney U test: Hom C1 vs. HetF [marginal cost = 2.4: Favorite 
and C1] α=.02, two-tailed). 
Thus, it seems that the way a cost factor comes into existence plays an important role for the 
behavior of participants. The player with higher marginal cost in the above constellation in the 
asymmetric treatment is the Underdog on a cost level of C0. Note, that this player suffers from 
an ex ante disadvantage due to his type, but nevertheless, his marginal costs are the lowest 
ones he can ever obtain, i.e. he did not experience any sabotage by another player. An 
interesting behavioral motive might be that being intentionally sabotaged by others 
discourages subjects more than being discriminated ex ante. 
 
 
6  Revelation of Saboteurs’ Identity 
In the treatments analyzed so far it is not revealed who is sabotaged by whom. Thus, an agent 
is not able to identify the saboteur if he is sabotaged by only one other player. Note, that an 
agent knows the identities of saboteurs if he receives sabotage of both competitors. Although 
from a theoretical point of view the revelation of the saboteurs’ identity should not be decisive 
for sabotaging behavior, it appears to be natural to assume that in a repeated setting there 
might be a considerable influence.  
First of all, if one’s identity is revealed, a participant who experienced a well-directed 
sabotage activity is likely to retaliate this unfriendly behavior in the next round by sabotaging 
the culprit herself. 
HYPOTHESIS  “RETALIATION”:  
Sabotage is retaliated by sabotage. 
This is in line with our next hypothesis. We conjecture that as long as agents stay anonymous 
when making the contest more onerous for other participants, one might lose one’s qualms 
and be rather tempted to exert higher sabotage. 
HYPOTHESIS  “REVELATION OF SABOTEURS”:  
Sabotage is lower if the saboteur’s identity is revealed. 
In order to test these two hypotheses we analyze three additional treatments, denoted by 
HomInfo, HetFInfo and HetUInfo, which are conducted with additional 90 participants. These 
treatments are identical to those investigated so far except for one feature: Now, the identities   23
of saboteurs are revealed after the first stage. In the next subsection, these three Info 
treatments are compared to the NoInfo treatments we have analyzed in the preceding sections. 
Following this, we investigate the sabotage activities in the Info settings regarding our 
hypotheses introduced in section 3. 
 
6.1  The influence of information 
As illustrated by Figure 7 we can confirm our first hypothesis regarding the retaliation of 
sabotage activities in the Info settings. 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “RETALIATION”:  
In the Info treatments an agent X more frequently sabotages an agent Y if that agent Y has 
sabotaged the agent X in the preceding round than if he had not.  
(Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank test , HomInfo: significant at 10 % level, HetFInfo and HetUInfo: 
significant at 1% level, all one-tailed) 
 
Figure 7:    Frequency of sabotaging a contestant dependent on being sabotaged from the same 
one in the previous round 
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OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “REVELATION OF SABOTEURS”:  
Sabotage in HetFInfo (HetUInfo) is lower than in HetF (HetU).  
(Mann-Whitney U test, HetF vs. HetFInfo: 5% level; HetU vs. HetUInfo: 10% level, one-
tailed) 
This observation is based on aggregated behavior of both types of agents. To disentangle the 
sabotage activities of Favorites and Underdogs Table 4 denotes the percentage of sabotage 
exerted by each type of player. Interestingly, only the two Favorites in HetFInfo sabotage 
significantly less than in HetF (Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed), and 
the two Underdogs in HetUInfo exert significantly less sabotage than in HetU (Mann-Whitney 
U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed). Hence, the group of players who are of the same 
type in each treatment seems to be responsible for the reduction in sabotage exertion if 
additional information is supplied. Table 4 also provides an overview over the frequencies of 
sabotage received by each type of player. Analyzing the experimental results by pairwise 
comparison of the treatments yields that the Underdog in HetF suffers significantly more 
often from sabotage than in HetFInfo (Mann-Whitney U test: significant at 5% level, one-
tailed), and in HetU the Favorite suffers from being sabotaged significantly more often than in 
HetUInfo (Mann-Whitney U test: significant at 5% level, one-tailed).  
Table 4: Sabotage per type of player in Info and NoInfo treatments 
  Sabotage exerted  Sabotage received 
 Info  NoInfo  Info  NoInfo 
Hom 
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   1 Favorite 














However, Table 4 does not indicate whether sabotage towards both competitors is decreased 
in the Info settings. Table 5 summarizes the results regarding the sabotage activity exerted by 
each type of player as well as which type of player suffers from it. It is quite obvious that the 
group of players who are of the same type in each of the asymmetric treatments exerts higher   25




Table 5: Sabotage per type of agent and type of agent aimed at 
  Underdog 
 sabotages  
Favorite 
Favorite 








  Info NoInfo Info NoInfo Info NoInfo Info NoInfo 
Hom 
3 Favorites 
    
54.44%          48.00%





43.17%        49.50% 
 
 
41.83%  <** 61.17% 
    
 
36.33%  <**  54.50%
HetU 
2 Underdogs  
1 Favorite 
 
55.67%  <**  73.67% 
    
41.83%  <**  66.83% 
 
 
60.67%          49.83%
By using the Mann-Whitney U test (one-tailed) the amount of sabotage exerted per statistically independent 
observation can be compared between the treatments. The level of significance at which the null hypothesis can 
be rejected in favor of the directed alternative hypothesis is denoted by: 
*  weakly significant:   5% < α  ≤ 10% 
** significant:   1%  <  α  ≤ 5% 
*** highly  significant:    α  ≤ 1%  
 
As mentioned above an additional piece of information in the Info treatments compared to the 
NoInfo treatments is only supplied if an agent has been sabotaged by one other player in the 
group. In both other cases – when he has been sabotaged by none or both of the competitors – 
each player receives the same information in both treatment variations because the cost levels 
are revealed to them. Thus, it appears to be interesting to investigate the agents’ reactions to 
being sabotaged once in both settings. Table 6 denotes how often a player sabotages one other 
player after being sabotaged once in the preceding round and how often a player sabotages 
both other players as a reaction to being sabotaged by one player. It is obvious that the type of 
player that is represented twice in each group significantly more frequently sabotages both 
competitors in the NoInfo condition than in the Info condition.
27 Moreover, in the asymmetric 
treatments the tendency to sabotage only one other player as a reaction to being sabotaged 
once is higher in the Info treatments.  
                                                 
26 In each round players may opt for sabotaging none, one or both of their competitors. If the amount of sabotage 
each subject exerts in each round is analyzed we observe that the reduction of the sabotage activity in the Info 
conditions compared to the NoInfo treatments is mainly due to an increased frequency of rounds where no other 
player is sabotaged and a decrease of the frequency of rounds where both other players in the group are 
sabotaged. 
27  Only the type of player that is represented twice in each asymmetric treatment sabotages significantly more 
often both other players after being sabotaged once in the NoInfo conditions than one other player (Wilcoxon 
test, Favorites in HetF and Underdogs in HetU: significant at 5% level, one-tailed).   26
Table 6: Reaction via sabotage of agents to being sabotaged in preceding round 
  Sabotage of one player after being 
sabotaged once in preceding round 
Sabotage of both players after being 
sabotaged once in preceding round 




33.08%                       36.29% 
 





26.72%                       30.31% 
40.08%         >**        24.66% 
 
36.38%                       32.90% 
21.16%          <***     46.16% 
HetU 
2 Underdogs  
1 Favorite 
 
35.30%          >*         27.19% 
39.17%          >*         20.59% 
 
33.37%          <*         58.45% 
37.16%                       40.75% 
By using the Mann-Whitney U test (one-tailed) the amount of sabotage exerted per statistically independent 
observation can be compared between the treatments. The level of significance at which the null hypothesis can 
be rejected in favor of the directed alternative hypothesis is denoted by: 
*  weakly significant:   5% < α  ≤ 10% 
** significant:   1%  <  α  ≤ 5% 
*** highly  significant:    α  ≤ 1%  
 
This finding might be explained by an aversion of subjects to treat equal types of players 
differently. In HetFInfo for example, an Underdog who has been sabotaged by one other 
player rather tends to retaliate this behavior by sabotaging both Favorites and not only the 
Favorite who had actually harmed him. Thus, the additional piece of information on the 
identity of the saboteur is not relevant for his act of retaliation. This applies analogically for 
the Favorite in HetUInfo. A Favorite in HetFInfo or an Underdog in HetUInfo, however, is 
confronted with a sabotage activity of one of the different types of players. If he knows the 
identity of the culprit only this type of agent is sabotaged. If he is not given the information on 
the identity in the NoInfo settings he tends to sabotage both competitors. 
 
6.2  Sabotage activities in the Info treatments 
This effect that the sabotage activities of those types of agents who are represented twice in 
the asymmetric treatments is decreased by supplying the information on the identity of the 
saboteurs affects the observations on the hypotheses from section 3. Figure 8 depicts the 










Figure 8:  Individual sabotage exerted by each type of player in the Info settings 
 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “RESIGNATION”:  
Underdogs sabotage Favorites less in HetFInfo than in HetUInfo. 
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 10% level, one-tailed) 
We can still weakly confirm our first hypothesis. However, this observation is weakened by 
the fact that Underdogs in HetUInfo reduce their sabotage activities if the culprits’ identities 
are revealed.  
 
Analogically, the Favorites exert higher sabotage activities in HetF with no information given 
on the identity of saboteurs than in HetFInfo with information supplied (see also Tables 4 and 
5). While we cannot confirm our hypothesis “Superiority” for the NoInfo settings we can now 
confirm the hypothesis for the Info treatments: 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “SUPERIORITY”:  
Favorites sabotage Underdogs less in HetFInfo than in HetUInfo. 
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed) 
The fact that the Favorites exert lower sabotage activities in HetFInfo is also reflected by the 
observation on our next hypothesis.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “VISIBILITY”:  
Favorites do not sabotage Favorites less in HomInfo than in HetFInfo. 
The observations on the next two hypotheses do not directly follow from our results regarding 
the influence of information from above. The Underdogs reduce their sabotage in HetU if 
Favorites
Underdog
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information on saboteurs’ identities is supplied but it is not obvious whether Underdogs tend 
to sabotage both of their competitors less.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “ALLIANCE”:  
Underdogs sabotage Underdogs less than Favorites in HetUInfo. 
(Mann-Whitney U test, significant at 5% level, one-tailed)  
The observation on our hypothesis “Alliance” weakly indicates that Underdogs tend to 
decrease their sabotage activities more vigorously towards the other Underdog than towards 
the competing Favorite. 
This uncertainty about the reduction of sabotage applies also to our last hypothesis regarding 
the activities of the Favorites in HetFInfo. 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS “BATTLE OF THE GIANTS”:  
Favorites do not sabotage Favorites more than Underdogs in HetFInfo.  
Thus, the observation on our last two hypotheses suggest that the type of player that is 
represented twice in the asymmetric contests decreases the sabotage activities rather towards 
the same type of player than towards the other competing type if the identity of the saboteur’s 
identity is revealed. 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
This paper reports on the first experimental study to investigate the behavior of heterogeneous 
agents in contests with sabotage. At the first stage of the game three contestants decide on 
sabotage by a binary choice for each of the other players individually. By sabotaging the 
marginal cost of effort of the sabotaged agent is increased. At the second stage all participants 
choose their effort. The relation of effort choices determines the probability of obtaining the 
high winner prize. A special focus of our analysis is the heterogeneity among agents. We vary 
agents with regard to ex ante marginal cost of effort, denoting low cost types as “Favorites” 
and high cost types as “Underdogs”. Thus, ex post marginal cost of effort is a compound of 
the ex ante type of agent and the amount of sabotage received in each round by both 
competitors.  
Contrary to our theoretic prediction agents do not always sabotage each other, and yield a 
Pareto-superior outcome. With regard to the contest stage we find that the exertion of effort is 
qualitatively in line with theory, i.e. effort is increasing in the sum of marginal costs of an   29
agent’s competitors and decreasing in one’s own marginal cost of effort. Besides, effort is 
much higher than predicted by theory. We find indicators that the way of emergence of 
marginal costs influences the behavior of agents. It seems as if an intentionally well-directed 
sabotage activity discourages agents more than an ex ante discrimination via the heterogeneity 
parameter. 
In an analysis of three additional treatments it becomes apparent that the revelation of the 
saboteur’s identity has a major influence on agents’ behavior. Agents tend to retaliate 
sabotage activities in the Info settings. As conjectured we find that sabotage is higher in 
asymmetric contests if the identity of saboteurs is not revealed. This is due to the two-person 
group of agents of the same type in each asymmetric treatment whose sabotage activities are 
higher without revelation of saboteurs.  
We investigate several behavioral hypotheses regarding the sabotage activities in the setting 
without information on the saboteur’s identity as well as in the Info treatments. We can 
confirm each of our behavioral hypotheses on sabotage in at least one setting. Thus, we find 
that not only the own type of player is decisive for the behavior of agents but the composition 
of different types of competitors in a contest. The revelation of the saboteur’s identity may 
systematically strengthen respectively weaken these effects.  
   30
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Appendix – Instructions (Example: HetUInfo) 
 
Rounds, Groups and Roles 
•  The experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round has two stages.  
•  You will be assigned to a group of three participants. During the whole experiment you will only interact 
with the participants of your group. The group is randomly composed and stays as such throughout the whole 
experiment. You will not be informed about who is a participant of your group.  
•  In every group there are participants of the following colors: Yellow, Red and Blue.  
•  The participant Blue has lower costs at the second stage than the participants Red and Yellow.  
•  Costs and payments are stated in the fictitious currency „Taler“. At the end of the experiment the sum of 
every round’s payments will be exchanged at a rate of 1 Euro per 1,200 Taler.. 
Stage 1 
•  You choose an A or a B for each other participant in your group.  
•  The number of As and Bs chosen by each participant for both other participants determines the cost level 
for this round, i.e. each participant’s decision at stage 1 influences the cost levels of both other player. In 
the following all possible combinations of A and B that can be chosen for a participant and the resulting 
cost levels are presented: 
two As      Cost Level AA 
one A and one B:   Cost Level AB 
two Bs:      Cost Level BB 
•  After you have chosen an A or a B for both other participants, you are informed about your cost level and 
the cost level of both other players in your group. Moreover, you are informed about the decisions of the 
both other players in your groups that led to your cost level.  
•  The cost for your choice of one A amounts to 0 Taler, and the cost for your choice of one B is 5 Talers. 
Stage 2 
•  At stage 2 you choose a number from {0, ..., 300}, which costs a certain amount of Talers. 
•  Each participant’s cost level determines the amount of costs for the number chosen in this round. Costs 
are lowest on cost level AA, higher on cost level AB and highest on cost level BB. Please learn the cost 
for the number to be chosen from the corresponding cost table. 
•  Please note: The participant Blue has lower cost than the participants Red and Yellow. For a specific cost 
level the costs of a specific number are always lower for participant Blue than for participants Red and 
Yellow. Attention: The participant Blue thus has different cost tables.  
•  After all three participants in a group have chosen their numbers, one participant obtains a high payment 
of 1,500 Talers, and the other two participants receive a low payment of 500 Talers each.  
•  Your own number and the numbers of both other players determine the probability with which each 
participant obtains the high payment of 1,500 Talers. The higher the number you choose, the higher is 
your probability to obtain the 1,500 Talers.  
Probability to obtain high payment = Own number / Sum of all three numbers 
•  After each participant has chosen her number, a „wheel of fortune“ determines the participant who obtains 
the high payment and the two participants who receive the low payments. The colored areas of the wheel of 
fortune correspond to the probabilities of the participants which result from the chosen numbers.  
•  Costs of your decision at stage 1 are deducted from your payment as well as costs for the number you have 
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Cost Table (Example: Underdog at Cost level 2) 
Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number  Cost 
1  3.92  61  239.12  121  474.32 181  709.52 241  944.72 
2  7.84  62  243.04  122  478.24 182  713.44 242  948.64 
3  11.76  63  246.96  123  482.16 183  717.36 243  952.56 
4  15.68  64  250.88  124  486.08 184  721.28 244  956.48 
5  19.60  65  254.80  125  490.00 185  725.20 245  960.40 
6  23.52  66  258.72  126  493.92 186  729.12 246  964.32 
7  27.44  67  262.64  127  497.84 187  733.04 247  968.24 
8  31.36  68  266.56  128  501.76 188  736.96 248  972.16 
9  35.28  69  270.48  129  505.68 189  740.88 249  976.08 
10  39.20  70  274.40  130  509.60 190  744.80 250  980.00 
11  43.12  71  278.32  131  513.52 191  748.72 251  983.92 
12  47.04  72  282.24  132  517.44 192  752.64 252  987.84 
13  50.96  73  286.16  133  521.36 193  756.56 253  991.76 
14  54.88  74  290.08  134  525.28 194  760.48 254  995.68 
15  58.80  75  294.00  135  529.20 195  764.40 255  999.60 
16  62.72  76  297.92  136  533.12 196  768.32 256  1003.52 
17  66.64  77  301.84  137  537.04 197  772.24 257  1007.44 
18  70.56  78  305.76  138  540.96 198  776.16 258  1011.36 
19  74.48  79  309.68  139  544.88 199  780.08 259  1015.28 
20  78.40  80  313.60  140  548.80 200  784.00 260  1019.20 
21  82.32  81  317.52  141  552.72 201  787.92 261  1023.12 
22  86.24  82  321.44  142  556.64 202  791.84 262  1027.04 
23  90.16  83  325.36  143  560.56 203  795.76 263  1030.96 
24  94.08  84  329.28  144  564.48 204  799.68 264  1034.88 
25  98.00  85  333.20  145  568.40 205  803.60 265  1038.80 
26  101.92  86  337.12  146  572.32 206  807.52 266  1042.72 
27  105.84  87  341.04  147  576.24 207  811.44 267  1046.64 
28  109.76  88  344.96  148  580.16 208  815.36 268  1050.56 
29  113.68  89  348.88  149  584.08 209  819.28 269  1054.48 
30  117.60  90  352.80  150  588.00 210  823.20 270  1058.40 
31  121.52  91  356.72  151  591.92 211  827.12 271  1062.32 
32  125.44  92  360.64  152  595.84 212  831.04 272  1066.24 
33  129.36  93  364.56  153  599.76 213  834.96 273  1070.16 
34  133.28  94  368.48  154  603.68 214  838.88 274  1074.08 
35  137.20  95  372.40  155  607.60 215  842.80 275  1078.00 
36  141.12  96  376.32  156  611.52 216  846.72 276  1081.92 
37  145.04  97  380.24  157  615.44 217  850.64 277  1085.84 
38  148.96  98  384.16  158  619.36 218  854.56 278  1089.76 
39  152.88  99  388.08  159  623.28 219  858.48 279  1093.68 
40  156.80  100  392.00  160  627.20 220  862.40 280  1097.60 
41  160.72  101  395.92  161  631.12 221  866.32 281  1101.52 
42  164.64  102  399.84  162  635.04 222  870.24 282  1105.44 
43  168.56  103  403.76  163  638.96 223  874.16 283  1109.36 
44  172.48  104  407.68  164  642.88 224  878.08 284  1113.28 
45  176.40  105  411.60  165  646.80 225  882.00 285  1117.20 
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